Security Overview

Security starts with knowing what the contracts can do, what they cannot do, and what has not been reviewed.

#Independent review

No value-bearing deployment should be treated as ready on the strength of repository tests alone. The vault share accounting, v3 callbacks, emission transitions, referral clipping, and every role handoff need independent review.

Contract updates required

15 source-level safety findings remain unresolved. Same-token Greenhouse recovery can currently include staked principal. EmissionController pause time can accrue after resume. Referral eligibility can desynchronize across WeedChef pools. WeedV3Vault share issuance can transfer existing idle assets or fees to later depositors. Greenhouse and Garden rescheduling can erase uncheckpointed prior-program rewards. Empty WeedChef positions can pre-arm or retain a matured harvest timer through a zero deposit or full exit and restake. WeedV3Vault deposits and redemptions can fail while its position is fully out of range. Referral bindBySig does not require invitee authorization and can permanently bind an unbound invitee. LiquidityBootstrapVault does not enforce pair-specific position creation or NFT locking before releasing its reserve. Budget vault initialization does not bind the protected asset to WEED, allowing an administrator to initialize with another matching-balance token and recover the WEED allocation; WEED is also recoverable before initialization. WeedChef emergency withdrawal can change pool-stake and active-allocation denominators before checkpointing elapsed emissions, over-crediting remaining users or redistributing historical pool allocation. WeedChef emergency withdrawal does not reset optional Rewarder stake and can leave stale reward accrual. WeedReferral preview can crowd out an invitee boost with commission that the referral vault later clips to zero. WeedChef pool reconfiguration can leave old Rewarder stake stale and omit existing stake from a replacement Rewarder. Rewarder schedules trust an out-of-band fundedAmount without transferring or verifying reward tokens, can strand undistributed balances, and have no recovery path. Solidity is unchanged in this documentation pass, so these components must remain undeployed.

#Contract controls

Fixed WEED supply with three exact genesis allocations and no later mint function.
Separate base-farming and referral budgets with cumulative caps.
After correct asset initialization, unrelated-token recovery rejects the address stored as budgetAsset; the missing WEED identity binding remains a launch blocker.
SafeERC20 transfers, reentrancy guards, and actual-receipt accounting on core asset paths.
Bounded deposit fee, harvest interval, referral rates, and vault slippage.
Duplicate WeedChef staking-token registration protection.

#User exit paths

WeedChef principal withdrawal and emergency withdrawal remain callable while reward accrual is paused. Direct v3 NFT unstake and withdrawal remain separate from the reward-pause control. Greenhouse and Garden principal exits are not blocked by their new-stake pause.

#External dependencies

WeedSwap depends on external tokens, Robinhood Chain, RPC providers, and configured Uniswap v3 contracts. A correct WeedSwap contract cannot prevent loss caused by market movement, a malicious token, an external integration failure, or a compromised user wallet.

#Before depositing

Confirm WeedSwap is deployed and the exact address is published.
Verify source code and roles on the chain explorer.
Read the farm fee, harvest timer, position type, and custody model.
Check token contracts, v3 range, slippage, deadline, and minimum outputs.
Use an amount you can afford to expose to complete loss.

Known risks →